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Abstract
In extant literature, ‘escalation of commitment’ is
viewed as a recommitment of resources to a failing
course of action that can lock projects into an ill-fated
path of failure. This view portrays all feedback
information driving recommitment decisions as
“negative” in nature. In this paper we question this
portrayal, joining an emerging alternative view that
makes no assumptions about the nature of feedback.
We take the view that feedback is inherently equivocal,
and regard escalation of commitment as decision
dilemmas arising out of such equivocality. Drawing on
a case study of a digital government project in
Indonesia, the paper explores this alternative view by
understanding the antecedents of escalation of
commitment deployed by key actors in steering a
failing project to become a reasonably successful one.
Theoretically, the paper suggests that the decision
maker’s dilemma is influenced by their personal
beliefs, cultural norms and institutional values. The
paper presents the notion of “perseverance of
commitment”, where escalation of commitment
emerges, and is subsequently reinforced through a
collective belief-driven reframing mechanism.

1. Introduction
The well-documented case of Project Taurus, an
information systems (IS) project commissioned by the
London Stock Exchange that collapsed after three
years of intensive work and almost 500 million pounds
of investment, is a somber reminder of organizations
unable to stop from committing a series of disastrous
decisions [1]. Although commitment to a strategy is
important for successful execution of IS projects, it is
often problematic when decision makers become
overcommitted to a strategy which does not yield
favorable outcomes. The problematic issue arises from
an impression of “throwing good money after bad”, by
continuing allocation of resources to a course of action
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with little or diminishing chance of success [2]. This
phenomenon of continuous or escalating commitment,
where decision makers recommit resources to a failing
course of action [3], has been an interest of
management researchers for more than 40 years. The
enduring interest, particularly in the field of IS project
management, partly comes from the link between
escalation of commitment and failing project situations
as well as project outcomes [4]. Therefore, there is a
significant body of work on escalation of commitment,
which is extending our understanding on why and how
this overcommitment happens in various contexts [5].
Early literature of escalation of commitment
describe it as a “syndrome of decision errors” leading
to a recommitment to a failing course of action. There
are three elements of escalation of commitment: (a) a
series of behaviors linking together as a course of
action toward a goal-state; (b) feedback that the course
of action is not achieving the goal-state (negative
feedback); and (c) there is an opportunity for making
decision on further allocation of resources to the same
course of action [3]. “Decision errors” happens when
decision makers continue the allocation of resource to
a course of action despite the feedback that the course
of action does not achieve the goal-state. Several
theories of escalation offer explanations of such
“decision errors” from the perspectives of
psychological and social justification (self-justification
theory) [6, 7], goal incongruency and information
asymmetry (agency theory) [8], sunk cost (prospect
theory) [9], and completion effect (approach avoidance
theory) [10]. In this view of escalation of commitment
as the result of decision errors, escalation is likely to
make a failing project fail further unless escalation of
commitment is interrupted or de-escalated, or the
project is abandoned.
However, there is an alternative view of escalation
of commitment, which challenges the assumption of
reliability on “negative feedback” because reliable or
complete information on the feedback or the outcome
from a course of action may not always available to
decision makers [11]. When feedback information is
unreliable or incomplete, feedback becomes equivocal
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which leads to a possibility for having multiple
interpretations of the feedback (negative, positive, or
ambiguous). So, a failing course of action may still be
perceived as having positive feedback. Bowen [11]
suggests that escalation of commitment is a “decision
dilemma”, as decision makers continue the same
course of action because that is the best option based
on the equivocal feedback available to them. The
consequence of equivocal feedback is that it is almost
impossible to judge if escalation of commitment is an
error because of the multiple interpretation of
feedback. Another consequence is that escalation of
commitment has the possibility for positive outcomes.
To summarize, most studies adopt the “decision
errors” view of the phenomenon [see 12, 13]. In this
view, positive outcome of escalation of commitment is
unlikely. On the other hand, the “decision dilemmas”
view suggest that it is possible for projects
experiencing escalation of commitment to achieve their
goal [11]. There is scarcity of research on escalation of
commitment leading to positive outcomes, which
motivates this study. Specifically, we aim to
understand the antecedents of escalation of
commitment deployed by key actors in steering a
failing project to become a reasonably successful one.
We attempt to uncover the antecedents of escalation of
commitment by studying a case of a drifting IS project
which is turned around back to its track with the help
of escalation of commitment.
We conducted an in-depth exploratory case study at
a digital government project in Indonesian central
government. Using qualitative interpretive approach,
our study revealed a process where escalation of
commitment emerges, and subsequently is reinforced,
through a belief-driven reasoning which is based on the
assessment of situation of the project. We suggest a
notion of “perseverance of commitment”, which is a
form of reasoned escalation of commitment. Our study
makes a theoretical contribution to the body of work on
escalation of commitment by highlighting the
significance of contextual personal, institutional and
cultural values in decisions dilemma leading to
escalation.

2. Escalation of commitment
In its early studies, the commonly used definition
for escalation of commitment (or “escalation”) is the
continued commitment in the face of negative
information or feedbacks about prior course of action
[3, 6, 11]. This situation is usually accompanied by
uncertainty on the likelihood of goal attainment [6].
However, some studies on escalation of commitment
challenge the significance of negative information or

feedbacks [8, 9, 11]. Recent escalation of commitment
studies adopts a relatively more generic definition,
which is the act of committing additional resources to
what appears to be a questionable or failing course of
action [5]. While the concept of escalation is rooted in
the field of social psychology [14], it has been studied
in related fields such as project management and
particularly in the context of IS project management
[e.g., 15, 16].

2.1. Major theories of escalation
The first major theory of escalation is selfjustification theory, which is drawn from theory of
cognitive dissonance [17]. The main premise of this
theory is the unwillingness of individuals to admit that
their previous decisions are failing. A lot of early
studies adopted this view [e.g., 6, 7, 14] which set the
reputation for self-justification theory as traditional
explanation of escalation. Self-justification theory
views escalation as driven by the need to demonstrate
rationality of earlier decisions. By escalating their
commitment, decision makers increase the effort for
reaching designated goals so they can prove that their
previous decision is correct, in other words “to make
good on” prior investments [3].
Whyte [9] highlights that in some studies [e.g., 7,
14] the effects of negative feedback and personal
responsibility are not consistent with self-justification
theory. He proposed an alternative explanation based
on prospect theory [18], where perceived outcome of
earlier decision (i.e., success or failure) determines the
framing of subsequent decision. With failing decision
(negative framing of feedback), decision makers frame
subsequent decision as a choice between losses. In that
situation, decision makers tend to adopt risk seeking
behavior, which leads to escalation. In short, escalation
of commitment is the outcome of the manner that
individuals frame decisions and subsequently choose
between alternatives.
Approach-avoidance conflict can also lead to
escalation [10]. Lewin [19] defined “approachavoidance conflict” as making decision on an action
which has both positive and negative effects or
characteristics. Decision of escalation bears negative
effect in additional allocation of resource, which acts
as restraining force. Despite that, there is a driving
force in the chance of achieving the goal. Escalation is
likely to happen when the cost of persistence on the
same course of action is outweighed by the size of the
reward for goal attainment, the cost of withdrawal, or
the proximity to the goal. As perceived proximity to
the goal increases, the motivation of individuals to
achieve that goal also increases. This “completion
effect” [20] then becomes a driver for escalation.
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Decisions dilemma theory argues that the concept
of “negative feedback” is ill-defined [21] because
researchers evaluate escalation of commitment in the
context of researchers’ own perception of negative
feedback. That “negative feedback” is actually
equivocal for decision makers [11]. Therefore, this
theory challenges the view of escalation of
commitment as decision errors or irrational reactions to
negative feedback. Instead, decision on subsequent
course of action is an interplay between individuals’
degree of commitment to a previous course of action
and perceived equivocality of feedback for that course
of action. This theory illustrates escalation of
commitment as following up on the existing
commitment to previous course of action in the face of
equivocal feedback. Equivocality of feedback incites a
decision dilemma between staying in current course of
action (escalation) or adopting a different course of
action.
We have presented a brief overview of major
theories of escalation of commitment (Table 1). To
summarize, there are several views on the motivation
behind escalation. Escalation has been explained as
self-motivated action, or a decision between avoiding
loss and going after gains. Escalation has also been
viewed as reflection of past events, or anticipation of
potential future outcomes. There is even a suggestion
that escalation is basically a decision makers’ response
to equivocal information, manifesting in a decision
dilemma.

2.2. Escalation of commitment in IS studies
IS studies on escalation exhibit similar pattern with
overall pattern of research on escalation of
commitment. For one, majority of those studies
adopted laboratory experimentations in their research
design. In addition to the resemblance in research

THEORY
Selfjustification
theory
Prospect
theory
Approachavoidance
theory

Decisions
dilemma
theory

design, IS studies on escalation also adopted many
constructs from field studies outside IS, such as the
effect of sunk cost [22], the framing of feedbacks [23],
and performance appraisal [16]. Therefore, the
contribution IS escalation studies mostly have been in
generalization of these variables as antecedents of
escalation in the field of IS.
However, there is a growing body of work in IS
research that investigates the development of process
theory for escalation of commitment. Some IS studies
proposes process of escalation of commitment as stage
or phase models [24]. Other studies describe process
within escalation of commitment as a sequence of
iterative events where actor-networks evolve [25] or
opposing forces between pro and against persistence
compete [26]. Some IS studies adopt the view that
reversal of escalation or de-escalation as an exit
strategy for escalation situation, and they investigate
various strategy recommendations for de-escalation of
commitment [12, 13]. Furthermore, IS scholars probe
the connection between escalation of commitment with
institutionalization [27], risk management [28], and
defective whistleblowing [29].

3. Research design
We chose qualitative exploratory case study with
interpretive approach [30] for our research method in
developing theoretical understanding of escalation of
commitment in a digital government project. Different
theoretical views on escalation of commitment and
diversity of contextual settings suggest that the
phenomenon is not yet sufficiently theorized. Within
this situation, exploratory case study is particularly
suitable to propose new theoretical insights [31].
We adopted Grounded Theory Method (GTM), an
inductive research method which can generate
substantive theories that are grounded in empirical data

Table 1. Theories of escalation of commitment
EXPLANATION
MAIN
ASSUMPTION ON
OF ESCALATION
CONCEPTS
FEEDBACK
Self-justification of
Psychological
the correctness of an
and social self- Negative framing of
earlier decision
justification
feedback (e.g.,
Risk-seeking behavior Sunk-cost
overruns in project
in a losing situation
effect
time and budget,
design problems, user
Forces driving
Completion
resistance,
continued
effect
continuous changes
commitment is
in user requirements)
stronger than forces
for discontinuation
Ambiguous feedback
Feedback
Feedback has
drives further
equivocality
multiple
commitment
interpretation

OUTCOME OF
ESCALATION
Without an intervention
to stop the escalation of
commitment (i.e., new
course of action), the
expected outcome of
the escalation of
commitment is the
failure of the project.
Outcome cannot be
determined prior to
escalation
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from systematic exploration of a phenomenon [32].
The benefits of GTM for this study include the
method’s capacity to interpret complex phenomena
through socially constructed experiences and processes
[33], and its accommodation of social issues in
discovering theory [32]. GTM is also suitable with the
focus of this study in investigating a process [34].

3.1. Case description
DGIndo is a directorate general under a ministry in
Indonesia. DGIndo is responsible for managing
treasury and accounting of government financial
transactions. It comprises of 33 regional offices and
181 field offices, serving more than 20,000
government working units throughout the country. As
part of its initiative to modernize treasury and
accounting of government financial transactions in
Indonesian central government, DGIndo initiated two
IS projects, Project N and Project S in 2007 and 2010,
respectively. Project N is the implementation of a
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) enterprise resource
planning (ERP) solution to replace the existing inhouse developed government treasury information
system, which DGIndo uses to provide treasury
services through all its regional and field offices.
World Bank provided the grant to finance Project N as
a multi-year project. On the other hand, the aim of
Project S is to implement an integrated information
system (hereafter “StarApp”) for all government
working units that is fully compatible with the new
treasury information system which was implemented
by Project N. Unlike Project N, Project S adopted inhouse development approach and was initially funded
from state budget as single-year project. In this paper
we focus on Project S as our study case. DGIndo
considered StarApp as a significant and visionary
breakthrough for government financial accounting in
Indonesia. Prior to StarApp, government financial
accounting system consisted of several standalone
applications. Each handling certain function, i.e.,
budgeting, financial commitment, payment, inventory,

fixed assets, treasury, and reporting. These application
periodically shared data among each other through
manual datafiles. This arrangement leads to issues of
data inconsistencies and required processes of data
reconciliation and compilation. From the beginning,
DGIndo envisioned StarApp as an integrated solution
with compatibility with internal (treasury ERP system)
and external (e.g., bank, external organizations)
information systems. The integrated design of StarApp
also enables government working units to provide
financial information and reports with improved data
quality in near real-time. StarApp would also improve
government’s financial accountability and transparency
through better data-sharing capability.
In the beginning, DGIndo set up Project S as a
single fiscal-year project. It was not long before Project
S underwent a lot of problems, leading to slow
progress and missed milestones. At the end of 2011,
StarApp failed the mandated user acceptance test
(UAT) because it could not satisfactorily deliver
several critical functionalities. The decision from UAT
team was a “no-go”, which means that StarApp needed
further development before moving on to the next
phase (i.e., piloting). However, being a single-year
project, there was not enough time and funding to
continue the necessary work. After securing another
financing source, this time from a grant from the
World Bank, the project continued in 2012. Progress
was slow and StarApp did not pass user’s acceptance
test until 2014. The project was still slowly progressing
when it began a three-stage piloting phase in 2015.
However, the progress rate of the project started to
improve as it enters the last stage of piloting phase in
2017. By the year 2018, all government working units
of DGIndo had fully replaced the old system with
StarApp and Project S proceeded to roll-out phase for
all other government working units.
The project team of Project S initially consisted of
a few personnel from development teams of previous
treasury information systems, who were selected
primarily based on their knowledge in existing
systems. Later, the project recruited new personnel
from DGIndo’s regional and field offices, especially

Figure 1. Timeline of projects
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those with experience and skill in software
programming. Members of Project S are typically
graduates from the state accounting academy, aged
between mid-20s to mid-30s. The office of Project S is
in DGIndo headquarter in the capital city of Indonesia,
where we conducted the fieldwork.

3.2. Fieldwork
Over a five-month period between June and
November 2018, we visited DGIndo headquarter to
collect data. In the beginning of our data collection, the
initial aim was to understand the case and to identify
major events. Given the interpretive approach of this
study, we explored and analyzed the perspectives of
members of project team on how the project evolved.
We also attended and observed several activities such
as project meetings, trainings of trainers, project
meetings and project team’s conference calls with
DGIndo’s field and regional offices as well as with
end-users of StarApp. We were given a desk in
DGIndo to work, with access to Project S members
workspaces. This access enabled us to have informal
conversations with members of project team, and to
have observations of daily operations of project team.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 11
individuals related to the project. (see Table 2).
Interviews were conducted in local language (Bahasa
Indonesia) to allow full expression from interviewees
in their responses to our questions. We assured before
each interview that we would keep the anonymity of all
interviewees in any report that we might produce from
this study. All interviewees gave their consent prior to
each interview, which were digitally recorded and
transcribed before then translated to English.
Interviewees included former and current software
programmers, project leaders, project managers, and a
director. Most of the interviewees had worked on
Project S since the beginning of the project. All project
members had been at DGIndo for more than 10 years.
The interviews began with a general question about
interviewees role and responsibility in Project S, which
was followed by an open discussion about their views
on major events and challenges of the project and their
involvement in those events. We also discussed their
perceptions on the conclusions of those events and how
those conclusions of events influenced the outcome of
the project. In general, all interviewees spoke freely in
our interviews, which was potentially in part because
the first author was an employee of DGIndo, and all
interviewees were professionally acquainted with the
first author. In addition to interviews, we also collected
secondary data from the DGIndo’s official website and
documentations, internal presentations, audio or video

recordings from official meetings and project’s
YouTube channel.
We analyzed the notes from observations and
informal conversations, as well as interview transcripts
to identify themes. Following GTM, we initially
approached data collection with a broad interest on
how digital government project takes place in the
context of developing countries. As our analysis
progressed, we focused our investigation on the
phenomenon of escalation of commitment after our
analysis revealed that escalation of commitment is
present as a phenomenon with significant importance
in our case. Through this process, we identified themes
relating to challenges during the implementation of
Project S and how members of the project team
resolved those challenges. We coded these themes into
three second-order concepts representing antecedents
of escalation of commitment: “feedback from previous
course of action”, “leadership ambiguity” and
“collective beliefs about work ethic”.
Table 2. Summary of collected data
Type of Data
Description
Semi-structured 12 hours of audio interview
interviews
recordings with various
stakeholders, including the
managing director, project
managers, project procurement
officer, project leaders, software
programmers, software testers, and
business process officer.
Audio and
Audio and video recordings of
video
project meetings, video conferences
recordings
with project stakeholders and
tutorial videos.
Organizational
Official documents and internal
documentation
presentations
Publicly
IndoDG website, YouTube public
available
channel, and government
materials
publications.

4. Findings and analysis
The empirical data showed that during the time
Project S was under a lot of difficulties, particularly
between 2012 until 2016, the project team continued
their effort despite the lack of significant progress. We
identified three main themes in our data, which are
prominent in escalation of commitment in Project S.
The first one is “feedback from previous course of
action”, which is in the center of decision making that
triggers escalation. The other two themes are
“leadership ambiguity” and “beliefs of good work
ethic”, both have influences in shaping the

Page 2285

interpretation of feedback. Below, we present the
analysis of our findings. We extend this analysis with
discussion in the next section.

4.1 Feedback from previous course of action
Feedback from escalation of commitment, hereafter
“feedback”, refers to information on the outcome of a
previous course of action. That feedback information
reflects the performance of the previous course of
action in reaching its goal state. Goal state refers to a
desired end state from a course of action. In the case of
escalation of commitment in Project S, previous course
of action refers to the decision to develop StarApp. The
goal state of this course of action is “delivery of
StarApp which can pass user acceptance test”.
Therefore, feedback in Project S refers to all
information that can be used to assess whether actions
of Project S bring it any closer to a delivery of StarApp
that meets expected standards in user acceptance test.
Project S obtained feedback information via several
methods. The first method was through reports of
project management such as deliveries and milestones.
Feedback information from this method suggested
negative interpretation of Project S progress of action
toward its goal-state. Project S failed to meet its first
deadline to pass user acceptance test in 2011. Later,
Project S also progressed slowly for several years
without being able to deliver the system.
The second method of obtaining feedback
information was through subjective interpretation of
surrounding environment by members of Project S. We
found that feedback information from this method
painted a more positive image of performance of
Project S. For example, members of Project S assigned
the perceived higher urgency of the parallel Project N
as a temporary factor in slow progress of Project S. A
project leader explained this view:
Because the magnitude of the project N was
enormous, it was decided that Project N would go
first until it settled, and after that we can focus on
Project S.
Another example of positive feedback information
in Project S is the appreciation from stakeholders such
as owners of business process. This appreciation may
suggest that expectation on delivery of StarApp was
still high. In words of a project leader:
With owners of business process, I think they
responded positively. Although not as much as
we hoped, at least we saw significant and active
responses from key persons who oversaw
decisions of policy in those units (owners of
business process).

We found that feedback of previous course of
action in Project S has characteristics of equivocal
information. Information from formal assessments of
project’s progress in delivering acceptable output
suggested negative interpretation of feedback. Yet,
subjective assessment by project members of
surrounding environment of the project hinted a
positive interpretation of feedback. These multiple
interpretations co-existed in the assessment of situation
by Project S. Below we describe the other main
themes, “leadership ambiguity” and “beliefs of good
work ethic”, which influence this equivocal feedback
information.

4.2 Leadership ambiguity
The theme of “leadership ambiguity” refers to the
uncertainties arising from conflicting messages in the
actions of individuals in the top management of the
organization. We observed two types of actions that
members of Project S perceived as signaling leadership
ambiguity. The first one is “conflicting decisions” from
individuals at different levels of DGIndo. The
conflicting decisions appears to come from certain
individuals who were not in full agreement with
development of StarApp in favor of existing systems.
Since these individuals were in middle level of
management overseeing some members of Project S,
they could give directives that in effect held back
Project S. As illustrated by a project leader:
In terms of work, it’s like there are two suns.
[laugh] And where would they take us?
Personally, we have no problem at all, but in
terms of coordination it is rather difficult. The
difficulty is because the instructions from each of
them (in top management) are rather less
conforming to each other. Ultimately, we
ourselves got nothing to lose. We did not wish
for anything, we only wished for clarity. The
director ordered one thing but echelon 3 (officials
who are directly below a director) did not give
the same order. That is confusing. [laugh]
Another type of action is the lack of decision
making, or “indecisiveness”, that would help clearing
up the uncertainty. By not making decisions to address
“leadership ambiguity”, the top management or
leadership in DGIndo gave space to ambiguity to settle
down in Project S. This condition leads to a sense of
frustration to members of Project S, as described by a
project leader:
In my opinion, to work on two systems; the
existing system, which is modified to resemble
StarApp and the StarApp itself, requires an
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extraordinary amount of effort. Where do we
want to go, really? That is all we want to know. If
we want to go for StarApp, then let us focus on it.
If not, then give us the order, ‘okay StarApp is
terminated, all of you can return to developing
existing system’.
The leadership ambiguity has an effect of feeding
on negative sentiments toward Project S, such as
confusion on the prospect of reaching the goal state of
the project, and further frustration from the ongoing
uncertainty. These negative sentiments boost negative
interpretation of feedback information. Both the
lingering confusion and the frustration in finding
guidance for breakthrough, support a view that Project
S was a lost cause.

4.3 Collective beliefs about work ethic
The theme of “collective work ethic beliefs” refers
to a set of beliefs which are collectively held by
members of Project S. These sets of beliefs shaped the
way Project S members processed feedback
information in their reasoning for the decision to
continue the project (escalation). Essentially, work
ethic beliefs represent the view of what constitutes
“good work ethos”. For example, members of Project S
believe that it is wrong to quit developing StarApp
because that would be like abandoning their
stakeholders, i.e., owners of business process and first
adopters of StarApp. As a project leader described:
We have moral responsibilities. We do not want
to be judged as opposing existing systems by
supporting StarApp. But who will handle
StarApp if we leave it, when it is still new? If
there are people who can pick up our work, we
would gladly hand it over. But if there is not, we
would feel bad for our friends.
This work ethic belief, which resides at individual
level, later emerged as collective beliefs in project
level as individuals discovered that they share the same
beliefs. We observed the collective nature of this belief
from an incident when project members agreed on a
collective action to bypass formal procedures so they
can clarify the uncertainty related to their work with
Project S.
There were nine of us, and we had discussion,
and we agreed to send an email, on behalf of all
of us, to all officers in our directorate. We
explained that we were not asking anything for
ourselves. But we were assigned here to secure
the development of StarApp. We want to clarify
our status, because we want to do well in our job.

The collective work ethic belief is further enforced
by existent institutional values in DGIndo. DGIndo
adopted a set of five institutional values from the
ministry which is its mother organization. These
institutional values are integrity, professionalism,
synergy, service, and perfection. These values are
widely promoted in the ministry as a set of good
virtues that all employees should strive for. We noticed
that some of these values were reflected in actions of
project members, for example when a project leader
spoke about “perfection” in his work:
I told to my friends, this is the problem here, this
is the potential problems. We disclosed
everything; everything should be thoroughly
reviewed. No half-baked solutions. With halfbaked solutions there will be more troublesome
later, we will be troubled by more testing.
The collective work ethic beliefs influence how
Project S processes feedback information. Since work
ethic beliefs, as well as extant institutional values,
represent values of nobility and goodwill, they project
positive sentiment toward the approach of Project S in
interpreting feedback information. In other words,
work ethic beliefs enable Project S to frame feedback
in a more positive light, despite the negative effect
from leadership ambiguity, which we have described in
previous subsection.
Furthermore, we found some cultural norms exist in
context Project S, which help Project S to focus on
positive interpretation. These cultural norms help
members of Project S in reconciling with negative
effect from leadership ambiguity. For example, it is
common in Indonesia to respect their elders or those
who are older than themselves, and that respect is
drawn from a common view that older people have
more experience and thus possess wisdom. By
adopting this cultural view, members of Project S
accept that despite projecting ambiguity, individuals in
senior management has good intentions. As a project
leader defended this view:
Back then, my superior officer had a different
view from our managing director on developing
StarApp. Yet, I felt like there was some truth in
the argument of my superior officer, because it
was based on his own experience. And we should
not blame him, because personally he is a good
man. I think if the purpose is good then there is
no reason for him not to support StarApp. It’s
just that he has different background and that was
what he thought was best, so that’s why he did it
(i.e., resisting Project S). And I think that is a
reasonable dynamic [laughing].
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5. Discussion
The above analysis shows the main themes of our
findings which are related to antecedents of escalation
of commitment. We present the overall process leading
to escalation of commitment below (see Figure 2). We
suggest a processual description of escalation of
commitment in a project as the reframing of negatively
distorted equivocal feedback information, which
refocus the decision-making process to positive
interpretation of the project.
We observed that multiple methods for assessing
the situation of a project may result in feedback
information with multiple interpretations (i.e., positive
and negative interpretations) emanating from the
previous course of action. This equivocal information
sets up the beginning of decision-making dilemmas on
whether to continue with the commitment to the
project. The dubious nature of the equivocal feedback
information makes it susceptible for amplification of
either the positive or negative interpretations.
Leadership ambiguity then amplifies the negative
interpretation of feedback information, by feeding
uncertainty and frustration to project members.
Effectively, leadership ambiguity distorts the equivocal
feedback information into a relatively more negative
interpretation (see Figure 2).
The negatively distorted feedback information
feeds into the reasoning process of the project to
resolve the decision dilemma (of whether it should
escalate their commitment on previous course of
action), but at the same time, collective beliefs of work
ethic provide positive influence to the same process
(see Figure 2). Here, institutional values serve as
promoters of goodwill which enforces work ethic
beliefs. Culture of respect also feeds in further
positivity to the reasoning process. The combined
influence of collective work ethic beliefs, institutional
values, and cultural norms of respect enable the project
to focus on positive interpretation of feedback

information. Essentially, the project’s reasoning
process acts to reframe the negatively distorted
feedback information to a positive feedback, which
justifies further commitment to the project (see Figure
2). We term this continued resilience in the face of
negative distortion of feedback from leadership
ambiguity as ‘perseverance of commitment’.
Responding to scarcity of research on escalation of
commitment leading to positive outcomes, our study
suggests that escalation of commitment can help
recovering a failing project by providing a mechanism
of defense or survival for a project. Through escalation
of commitment, even low-level members of a project
can mount a defensive action in the face of leadership
ambiguity. In the longer run, this entrenchment posture
may help the survival of the project, by allowing a low
or nonperforming project to continue until it reaches a
more favorable performance. Finally, the emergence of
escalation of commitment in our case study is
characterized by drawing from collective beliefs,
institutional values, and cultural norms to summon a
positive interpretation of the feedback information. To
that characterization, we posit this positive form of
escalation of commitment as a form of perseverance.
The concept of perseverance underlines the nature of
continued resilience in the face of negative distortion
of feedback from leadership ambiguity.

5.1 Theoretical implications
Building on the discussions above, we highlight
several theoretical implications from our study,
particularly in the context of digital government project
of a developing country. First, our study provide
empirical support for the view of escalation of
commitment as “decision dilemma” [11]. Our study
suggests that factors such as “leadership ambiguity”
and “beliefs of good work ethic” may amplify the
“decision dilemma”. Second, while our study assumes
the view of equivocal feedback information rather than

Figure 2. Model of perseverance of commitment
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a definite negative feedback, one can argue that
reframing feedback is another form of self-justification
[6, 7, 14]. In our study, reframing feedback serves as
justification mechanism in rationalizing a negatively
distorted feedback information. Third, the adoption of
framing in our study highlight a resemblance to
prospect theory [9], where negative framing of
feedback leads to risk-seeking and escalation of
commitment. However, we identified different role of
framing, which is promoting positive interpretation to
push for continuation of commitment. Fourth, our
findings on the role of beliefs of good work ethic
suggests that escalation of commitment as an issue of
fulfilling certain behavioral standards and expectations.
Following approach avoidance theory [10], we suggest
that sustaining negative effect of leadership ambiguity
as alternative view of “cost”, and moral satisfaction
from fulfilling beliefs of good work ethic as “reward”.
As such, our study may compliment approach
avoidance theory in explaining escalation of
commitment in government or public sector, where
concepts of “cost” and “loss” are less tangible than in
private sector. To sum up, our study suggests an
alternative explanation of the process behind escalation
of commitment by highlighting how various actors tap
into the equivocality of feedback information, through
either distortion or reframing of feedback.

of projects, including IS projects, our study of a digital
government project in Indonesia suggest that it may
not always be the case. While some escalation studies
have challenged the assumption behind escalation of
commitment, our study takes a further step by
understanding how escalation of commitment may not
always be a questionable act but rather a force of good
through a value-driven reasoning. Using military
analogy with our study case, escalation of commitment
rather acts as entrenchment strategy that serves as
beachhead for turning a runaway project around toward
the intended direction. Escalation of commitment may
be successful when initiated from the segment of the
project with value-driven individuals with good
assessment of situation on the ground, followed by
reiterated process that enables perseverance of
commitment to grow into mobilization of support.
We acknowledge that this study has its limitation.
The model is relatively a bird-eye view of the process
behind escalation of commitment. We intend to extend
our study by exploring further the reasoning
mechanisms involved in our process model. The study
is also based on one study case, therefore future similar
studies in different context may improve or extend our
model.

5.2 Practical implications

The authors would like to express their gratitude to
the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP)
for funding this research.

The general view of escalation of commitment is
unfavorable, especially with its association with
conditions of a failing project. However, there is a
scenario where escalation of commitment may have
positive value through preservation in commitment.
Practitioners might find this study useful in evaluating
occurrences of escalation of commitment in their likely
failing IS projects. This study can help IS project
managers, especially in public sector of developing
countries, to distinguish between ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ escalation of commitment based on
characterization of ambiguity of management,
prevalent collective value-set, and proximity between
reasoning process for escalation and feedback
information. Once managers identify the type of
escalation of commitment, they can consider
subsequent strategies between managing the
perseverance of commitment or considering deescalation or reversal of escalation.

6. Concluding remarks
Despite general perception in literature that
escalation of commitment is not good for the trajectory

7. Acknowledgments

8. References
[1] Drummond, H., Escalation in Decision Making, The
Tragedy of Taurus, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.
[2] Lin, Y.-E., W.-M. Fan, and H.-H. Chih, "Throwing Good
Money After Bad? The Impact of the Escalation of
Commitment of Mutual Fund Managers on Fund
Performance", Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2014, 15(1): p.
1-15.
[3] Staw, B.M., "The Escalation of Commitment to a Course
of Action". Academy of Management Review, 1981, 6(4): p.
577-587.
[4] Baghizadeh, Z., D. Cecez-Kecmanovic, and D.
Schlagwein, "Review and Critique of The Information
Systems Development Project Failure Literature: An
Argument for Exploring Information Systems Development
Project Distress", Journal of Information Technology, 2019.
[5] Sleesman, D.J., A.C. Lennard, G. McNamara, and D.E.
Conlon, "Putting Escalation of Commitment in Context: A
Multilevel Review and Analysis", Academy of Management
Annals, 2018, 12(1): p. 178-207.

Page 2289

[6] Brockner, J., "The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing
Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress", Academy
of Management Review, 1992, 17(1): p. 39-61.
[7] Staw, B.M. and J. Ross, "Commitment to A Policy
Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective", Administrative
Science Quarterly, 1978, p. 40-64.
[8] Harrison, P.D. and A. Harrell, "Impact of “Adverse
Selection” on Managers' Project Evaluation Decisions".
Academy of Management Journal, 1993, 36(3): p. 635-643.
[9] Whyte, G., "Escalating Commitment to a Course of
Action: A Reinterpretation", Academy of Management
Review, 1986, 11(2): p. 311-321.
[10] Brockner, J. and J.Z. Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating
Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1985.
[11] Bowen, M.G., "The Escalation Phenomenon
Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?".
Academy of Management Review, 1987, 12(1): p. 52-66.
[12] Pan, G. and S.L. Pan, "Transition to IS Project DeEscalation: An Exploration into Management Executives’
Influence Behaviors", IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, 2011, 58(1): p. 109-123.
[13] Mähring, M., M. Keil, L. Mathiassen, and J. Pries-Heje,
"Making IT Project De-Escalation Happen: An Exploration
into Key Roles". Journal of the Association for Information
Systems, 2008, 9(8): p. 462-496.
[14] Staw, B.M., "Knee-Deep in The Big Muddy: A Study of
Escalating Commitment to A Chosen Course of Action".
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1976,
16(1): p. 27-44.
[15] Keil, M., "Pulling the Plug: Software Project
Management and the Problem of Project Escalation". MIS
Quarterly, 1995, 19(4): p. 421-447.
[16] Lee, J.S. and M. Keil, "The Effects of Relative and
Criticism-Based Performance Appraisals on Task-Level
Escalation in an IT Project: A Laboratory Experiment".
European Journal of Information Systems, 2018, 27(5): p.
551-569.
[17] Festinger, L., A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Vol.
2, Stanford University Press, 1957.
[18] Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk", in Handbook of the
Fundamentals of Financial Decision Making, 1979, p. 99127.
[19] Lewin, K., "A Dynamic Theory of Personality",
McGraw Hill, New York, 1935.
[20] Conlon, D.E. and H. Garland, "The Role of Project
Completion Information in Resource Allocation Decisions".
Academy of Management Journal, 1993, 36(2): p. 402-413.

[21] Northcraft, G.B. and G. Wolf, "Dollars, Sense, and Sunk
Costs: A Life Cycle Model of Resource Allocation
Decisions". Academy of Management Review, 1984, 9(2): p.
225-234.
[22] Keil, M., D.P. Truex, and R. Mixon, "The Effects of
Sunk Cost and Project Completion on Information
Technology Project Escalation", IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management, 1995, 42(4): p. 372-381.
[23] Liang, Ting-Peng, Nai-Shing Yen, Tsan-Ching Kang,
and Yu-Wen Li. "Escalation of Commitment in Software
Projects: An Examination of Two Theories." Pacific Asia
Conference on Information Systems, 2013, p. 44.
[24] Mähring, M. and M. Keil, "Information Technology
Project Escalation: A Process Model", 2008, 39(2): p. 239272.
[25] Mähring, M., J. Holmström, M. Keil, and R.
Montealegre, "Trojan Actor‐Networks and Swift Translation:
Bringing Actor‐Network Theory to IT Project Escalation
Studies". Information Technology & People, 2004, 17(2): p.
210-238.
[26] Pan, S.L., G.S.C. Pan, M. Newman, and D. Flynn,
"Escalation and De-Escalation of Commitment to
Information Systems Projects: Insights from A Project
Evaluation Model", European Journal of Operational
Research, 2006, 173(3): p. 1139-1160.
[27] Park, K.J. and N. Berente, "Institutionalization,
Embedded Rationality, and the Escalation of Commitment to
IT Projects", 45th HICSS, 2012.
[28] Parinyavuttichai, N. and A. Lin, "Reexamination of The
Information Systems Project Escalation Concept: An
Investigation from Risk Perspectives", in Strategic Project
Management: Contemporary Issues and Strategies for
Developing Economies, 2015, p. 179-202.
[29] Keil, M. and D. Robey, "Turning around Troubled
Software Projects: An Exploratory Study of the Deescalation of Commitment to Failing Courses of Action",
Journal of Management Information Systems, 1999, 15(4): p.
63-87.
[30] Myers, M.D., "Qualitative Research in Information
Systems", MIS Quarterly, 1997, 21(2): p. 241-242.
[31] Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods.
Fifth ed., Sage Publications Ltd., London, 2014.
[32] Glaser, B.G. and A.L. Strauss, The Discovery of
Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research,
Routledge, 1967.
[33] Charmaz, K., Constructing Grounded Theory: A
Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis, Sage, London,
2006.
[34] Creswell, J.W., Qualitative Enquiry and Research
Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. 2nd ed., Sage
Publications, Thousand Oaks CA, 2007.

Page 2290

